Soft-error detection in FPGAs typically requires replication, doubling the required area. We propose an approach which distinguishes between tolerable errors in data-flow, suchas arithmetic, and intolerable errors in control-flow, such as branches and their data-dependencies. This approach is demonstrated in a new high-level synthesis compiler pass called StitchUp, which precisely identifies the control critical parts of the design, then automatically replicates only that part. We applied StitchUp to the CHStone benchmark suite and performed exhaustive hardware fault injection in each case, finding that all control-flow errors were detected while only requiring 1% circuit area overhead in the best case.
INTRODUCTION
High-level Synthesis (HLS) tools, such as LegUp [2] and Vivado HLS [5] , can automatically generate FPGA circuits from C code. Listing 1 gives a simple example of a synthesisable dot-product, which combines data-dependent control-flow in the for loop (line 3), and pure data-flow in the body of the for loop (line 4). HLS tools will generate a circuit which executes correctly in a reliable FPGA, but what if this circuit is required to execute in the presence of soft errors? The naive approach would be to instantiate two or more copies of the circuit and run them in lock-step on the same input data, with any deviations between their states or outputs indicating an error. Naive replication is expensive in both area and more importantly power, especially in this example as expensive floating point arithmetic units are required for the multiply accumulate computation (line 4).
When tight area and power constraints prevent full replication, then reliability can still be improved through selectively replicating "important" portions of the design. Studies have shown that some applications, such as media processing [9] and machine learning [15] , contain critical regions of code that are sensitive to soft errors, and non critical regions that can tolerate soft errors.
Control-flow regions, (i.e. instructions effecting branch decisions), are arguably more critical than data-flow, since faults within control-flow can effect real time guarantees or prevent program termination. Previous work has demonPermission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org. [4, 3] generating reliable HLS circuits for control-flow intensive (CFI) ASIC designs, and [12, 10, 15] performing fault injection experiments demonstrating that control-flow is vulnerable to errors.
For example, faults within the control structure of our dot product example (Listing 1) could cause elements of A and B to be skipped in the calculation of c, or even worse, cause the circuit to enter an infinite loop and never terminate. This paper presents an approach for automatically extracting the control flow structure for a HLS application so that it can be selectively replicated to protect control decisions and ensure all branches are taken correctly. Figure 1 (a) provides a diagram of the default HLS generated circuit for our dot product example. Two clear partitions can be seen, a data path where functional units reside, and a control FSM responsible for scheduling instructions onto the functional units. In order to replicate only the control-flow structure, any data-path functional units which may influence a state transition need to be duplicated along with the control FSM. We shall refer to the collection of the control FSM and control dependent data-path elements as the control replicant, Figure 1(b) shows the control replicant for our dot product example.
Analysing the code in Listing 1 we can determine that the instructions which influence control-flow decisions are the ones used in the for loop conditions, which require an integer comparator icmp and adder iadd. In comparison, the expensive floating point units, fpmul and fpadd, required for calculating the multiply add accumulate have no influence over any branch decision and will not be replicated.
Manually inspecting code and removing elements that don't influence control flow is simple in the case of our dot product example. However as the complexity of the input program increases, the engineering effort required to both analyse the input code and generate the replicated control FSM is significant. StitchUp fully automates this process through the use of static analysis technique, known as program slicing, to extract and duplicate any instructions that may influence control. The contribution of this paper are:
• StitchUp, an approach for decoupling control-flow and data-flow to increase circuit relability. 
FPGA DEVICE FAULTS DUE TO SOFT-ERRORS
A Soft Error or Single Event Upset is a random, noncatastrophic error, where radiation causes a perturbation to a circuit by temporarily altering a single signal or datum. Detecting and mitigating such errors is important in some fields, such as satellite design, where high design costs, harsh environments, and the difficulties in repairing once deployed make it necessary. Additionally, due to the continuing increase in semiconductor density, the current soft error challenges experienced in space will also occur in future terrestrial devices. [11] [8] .
FPGA devices work by mapping circuit descriptions into a collection of Logic Elements, which are described in programmable Look-Up-Tables (LUTs) and routed together via programmable switchboxes. Configuration data for both the look-up-tables and switchboxes are stored in an SRAM based configuration memory, which means soft errors can either change the functionality of Logic Elements or can change the routing between them. Other memories called block memory and flip-flops are also present in FPGA devices, and soft errors in these regions can cause transient errors in the circuit.
For ASIC designs, registers are the most vulnerable to soft-errors with combinational logic contributing very little to overall circuit relability [1] . This makes ASIC approaches which analyses and protect vulnerable registers, such as in [4] , promising approaches. However in FPGA devices the most vulnerable region is the SRAM based configuration memory, so such approaches would have little impact requiring methods that perform combinatorial logic replication, such as StitchUp or DMR/TMR.
Circuits described within configuration memory are usually protected in one of two ways: (1)the circuit is replicated with comparison; (2)ECC/CRC signals associated with frames of the configuration memory are regularly scanned for errors. Replication uses extra area and power but has low error detection latency and can protect both configuration memory and registers, while ECC/CRC checks consume less area and power in exchange for higher detection latency and an inability to protect registers.
For this paper our fault model assumes that a single soft error can occur at most every clock cycle, and that this error can effect block memory, SRAM configuration memory, or flip-flops. Since errors are not solely within the configuration memory, replication must be used, as configuration ECC/CRC cannot protect the registers in our control structure. Figure 1 shows a StitchUp generated circuit for the dot product example in Listing 1, with the original circuit on top and the control-flow structure shadow beneath it. StitchUp aims to protect all configuration, block, and Flip-flop bits within the trust boundary (grey box) as everything outside, such as routing to external I/O or DDR, is not protected.
STITCHUP OVERVIEW
Finding and extracting the high-level control-flow structure from an RTL description of a large circuit is difficult, whether it is attempted automatically or manually. Finding the high-level control-flow in a high-level input source is easy, but manually extracting an equivalent circuit is still challenging for large designs. StitchUp can automatically perform this extraction as a compiler pass, which can be easily invoked by setting a compiler flag in the LegUp HLS tool. This section discusses how our analysis is implemented in StitchUp enabling the automatic extraction of the control-flow structure along with the generation of the control replicant. An open source version of our tool described in this paper can be found at https://github.com/STFleming/StitchUp. Figure 2 shows the transformation process from a C program to a control-flow protected Verilog hardware description, with StitchUp specific sections highlighted in grey. Initially the C input is passed into the standard LegUp frontend, which is a series of passes that perform various tasks, such as annotating instructions with pipelining information. This outputs an LLVM intermediate representation (LLVM-IR) which is passed both into the backend of LegUp, to generate the original unprotected circuit and also into the frontend of StitchUp to generate the control replicant circuit. Finally an integration stage connects the original circuit to the duplicate control-flow circuit and generates comparison logic to ensure that the state registers match.
Our motivation for integrating our tool with LegUp is primarily due to it being open source, as the StitchUp backend requires modification to the generation of the schedul- ing control FSMs. However, the technique itself could be incorporated in VivadoHLS and all other HLS tools through modifying the generated control FSM in a different fashion, (such as modifying the output HDL directly). It is common for modern HLS tool to be constructed on top of LLVM-IR which has a similar level of abstraction to assembly code. It also has two important features for writing compiler optimisations: first, all instructions are in single static assignment form (SSA) where every variable is only assigned once; and second, instructions are grouped into straight-line sequences known as basic blocks (BB) where there is only one entry branch at the very start of the block, and one exit branch at the very end.
Extracting the Control Instruction Set
LLVM-IR, which is passed into the frontend of StitchUp, is naturally arranged into a CDFG where each node is a basic block and edges are branch between them. An example of the CDFG from the dot product in Listing 1 is shown on the left side of Figure 3 . The StitchUp frontend performs a backwards analysis walking the CDFG from bottom to top, collecting any control flow related instructions that may influence whether an edge transition is taken.
All instructions deemed to be control related are collected into what we refer to as a Control Structure Instruction Set (CSIS ), which can be used to generate a control replicant. Each basic block, i, in the input CDFG will have it's own associated CSIS i containing all instructions that may effect control-flow after this point in the program. The overall CSIS for the input is CSIS s where s is the initial basic block of the input program.
Algorithm 1 is used to construct the CSIS for all nodes in the CDFG. It requires a fixed point iteration until the set of all CSIS , CCSIS has reached a stable state which can be seen in line 1-2. Each iteration walks backwards from the final basic block of the CDFG to the start basic block, as seen in line 3, and for each encountered the corresponding CSIS is updated using the following rules:
Rule 1 Sucessor (B ) returns the set of all basic blocks in the CDFG that follow on from the basic block B. For all successor j of basic block i this rule adds every element of CSIS j to CSIS i. Rule 2 Adds all branch instructions for the current basic block, i, to CSIS i using TerminatingInstruction(i) a function which returns the final instruction from the basic block i. Rule 3 Any instruction within the current basic block (i) that is used as an operand (opc) by an element of CSIS i is added to CSIS i 1 Algorithm 1 CSIS Extraction Static Analysis Algorithm INPUT: a program, P , set of Basic Blocks, {BB 0...BB N } OUTPUT: P a program consisting of Ic the set of control structure instructions.
1: while CCSIS != PCSIS do 2:
for each B ∈ {BBN , . . . , BB0} do 4: 5:
for each S ∈ Successor(B) do Rule 1 6:
for each Ic ∈ CSIS S do 7:
CSIS B ∪ {Ic} 8: 9:
T ∈ T erminatingInstruction(B) Rule 2 10:
CSIS B ∪ {T } 11:
for each op ∈ T do 12:
CSIS B ∪ {op} 13: 14:
for each I ∈ B do Rule 3 15:
for each Ic ∈ CSIS B do 16:
for each opc ∈ Ic do 17:
if I = opc then 18:
To demonstrate this we will apply Algorithm 1 to the dot product example in Listing 1 to extract the control-flow structure, labelled StitchUp in Figure 3 . For each update to a CSIS , the label for the instruction added from 3 is given along with the rule from Algorithm 1 used to add it. Initially CSIS i = ∅ for all basic blocks i Iteration 1: CSISBB2: add I2.0:return using rule 2 CSISBB2 = {I2.0} CSISBB1: add every element in CSIS BB2 using rule 1 add I1.2:br i<20 BB2 using rule 2 add I1.1:i++ using rule 3 CSISBB1 = {I2.0,I1.2,I1.1} CSISBB0 : add every element in CSIS BB1 using rule 1 add I0.1:br BB1 using rule 2 add I0.0:i=0 using rule 3 CSISBB0 = {I2.0,I1. 
EXPERIMENT SETUP
To test the error mitigation abilities of StitchUp generated circuits we have adopted the FPGA gold standard of hardware fault injection, where configuration bits on the FPGA device are flipped from their original state. Typical FPGA designs will require a large number of configuration bits often making full exhaustive testing infeasible, usually resulting in the adoption of random testing. However in our case we have developed an experiment platform allowing us to achieve full exhaustive fault injection in reasonable time, for example reducing the time to exhaustively test the smallest CHStone circuit dfmul from 4 days to 8 hours.
We make use of many low cost Xilinx FPGA SoC devices known as Zedboards all injecting faults on the same circuit in parallel. Each Zedboard runs a full Linux OS on its hardened ARM processor, and is arranged into a cluster managed by a single desktop.
To flip individual configuration bits a Xilinx Soft Error Mitigation (SEM) IP Core connected to the FPGA internal configuration port (ICAP) was used -targeting Xilinx devices was possible due to the latest release of LegUp (v4.0) which has the ability to generate generic Verilog circuits. For each experiment the SEM core and the test circuit were instantiated and connected to the ARM processing system via AXI interconnects. Figure 4 shows an overview of the experiment setup. The top flow generates a standard LegUp circuit with no protection; the middle uses StitchUp to generate a control-flow structure protected circuit; and the bottom generates a full DMR protected circuit duplicating the original LegUp circuit and generating comparison logic on the control FSM state register;
Each different version is then passed through the Xilinx FPGA circuit tool flow to produce two files: an essential bits file (.EBD), and a configuration binary (.BIN). The essential bits file is a list of configuration memory bits that have any influence on our generated circuit and is used to reduce the number of injections required to fully test our design.
2 For each experiment the EBD files are divided up into smaller chunks, and each chunk is processed in parallel on a different Zedboard device.
Software running on the ARM of each Zedboard marshals each test by, injecting a fault, running the circuit, and storing the result. The injected fault is then repaired by re-injecting an error into the same configuration memory location (i.e. flipping the bit back to it's original state). Some faults may cause the circuit to never terminate, so if no response is seen within three orders of magnitude of its expected time a, timeout halts its execution. The results are then analysed and each test outcome is classified into three distinct categories:
1. Execution Time Error ETE -This is where the execution of the circuit either took an incorrect number of cycles to complete or timed out. Errors of these type are control flow related, since any deviation from the correct execution path will cause an incorrect number of cycles. 2. Data-Flow Only Errors DOE -These are errors where the circuit has returned an incorrect data result but has executed in the correct number of cycles, such as error caused by faults in a non-control structure functional unit. 3. Caught Errors CE -These are errors in the state register that were detected by the protection method, which is either DMR or StitchUp.
For each test the proportion of ETE, DOE, and CE error results should sum to 100%. ETEs are the most critical since they are control related and may affect runtime guarantees or cause timeouts; DOEs are the next critical category since there is an error in data, but no damaging effect on control; and CEs are the least critical, where the circuit has failed but at least it has been detected.
EXPERIMENT RESULTS
To test the strengths and weaknesses of the StitchUp approach compared to DMR both techniques were evaluated on the CHStone benchmark suite. In order to explore the effects of varying control-to-data ratio, we also evaluate the example code from Listing 1 while varying the degree of loop unrolling to increase data parallelism. In all cases the resources in terms of LUTs, registers (REG), and DSPs were compared; and where the circuits could be implemented on Zedboard/ZC702 devices, power results were obtained, and exhaustive error injection was performed. Figure 5 shows how the DOEs and CEs vary as the loop in Listing 1 is unrolled. Increasing the unroll factor reduces the control-to-data ratio since the number of basic blocks remains constant but the number of (data-flow) only functional units instantiated in parallel increases. This effect is observable in the results since the data only errors increase with the unroll factor but the number of caught errors remains constant. A similar trend can be observed for the percentage LUT overhead where the DMR overhead tends towards 100% as the unroll factor increases, while the StitchUp overhead tends towards 0%. This tells us that as more non-control-structure instructions are executed in parallel, the overhead required for StitchUp protection remains unaffected. Table 1 shows the required resources and power to implement each of the CHStone benchmark circuits 3 with, no protection (original), StitchUp protection, and DMR protection. Figure 6 shows the relative percentage LUT overhead for the protection strategies on each circuit. In cases where the control-flow and data-flow are decoupled, little replication is required -this effect can be seen in the encryption benchmarks (aes, blowfish, sha) where replication can be as little as 1% of the original circuit. However there are other cases where protecting just the control flow structure results in DMR, such as dfsin or dfdiv. The amount of replication required by StitchUp is application dependant, however, from these results we can see that for a significant number of applications a low proportion of the original circuit needs to 3 with the exception of JPEG, which could not be routed onto our largest device because it is too large Comparison of % power overheads required for both StitchUp and DMR, where DMR power results for aes and adpcm could not be obtained because they are too large to implement on our power measurement platform.
Unrolling Results

Resource Overheads
be replicated to protect the control-flow structure. Figure 7 shows the percentage power overheads for all circuits which can be implemented on the ZC702. When compared to the resource overhead results there is a close correlation between resources required and power consumed. Along with some CHStone circuits the results for Listing 1 can be seen for an unroll factor 2 in dp2, 4 in dp4, and 8 in dp8. As the unroll factor increases and the ratio between control and data decreases the difference between the amount of power required by DMR and StitchUp also increases, with StitchUp consuming less power as more work is performed in parallel. This shows that not only does StitchUp have the potential to save area but that this also translates into a saving in power. 
Power Results
Fault Injection Results
For every benchmarks possible to implement on the Zedboard device exhaustive error injection was performed with each error categorised into either ETE, DOE, or CE. Figure  8 shows the different proportions of these errors for each circuit, and in all cases we can see that the ETE have been removed for both StitchUp and DMR. Generally, the proportion of the circuit that is replicated corresponds to the proportion of detected faults: for example aes requires little replication but detects only ETEs; or dfsin, which requires a high proportion of replication but also detects a high proportion of errors. However there are some circuits between these extremes where the amount of replication returns a greater proportion than expected of errors caught, such as adpcm where a 40% replication results in 80% of errors caught. From these results not only can we see that StitchUp has the ability to remove all ETEs, but also can catch a high proportion of errors relative to the amount of the original circuit that was replicated.
RELATED WORK
The majority of reliable HLS approaches to date have come from the development of ASICs, and generally revolve around the idea of modifying the allocation, scheduling, and binding stages to include a library of components with different reliability criteria [14] [6] [7] . This library is then searched to determine the maximum possible reliability while meeting other constraints. We believe that our work is complimentary to these approaches, as we can protect the control-flow structure for a more reliable configuration of components.
More recent approaches have used static analysis techniques to analyse the vulnerabilities of registers based on their execution lifetimes [4] . While this approach is effective, it mainly targets ASIC designs, where register vulnerability is the largest concern. In FPGA devices this is not the case since the SRAM configuration memory is the most vulnerable region with register soft errors contributing very little.
Shastri et al. in [13] examined how HLS for FPGA reliability could be achieved by providing an allocation and scheduling algorithm which took into account the reuse and redundancy of certain shared resources. Again our approach is complimentary to this one, since it could be used to improve the reliability of the data path while we protect the control-flow structure.
CONCLUSION
Control-flow errors can be catastrophic, causing real-time deadlines to be missed, or worse non-termination. This work presents StitchUp a compiler flag for the Open Source HLS tool LegUp, which can automatically extract and protect the control-flow of an input program. To demonstrate this we applied it to the popular HLS benchmark suite CHStone and performed exhaustive hardware error injection on a selection of circuits. Our results show that StitchUp is capable of detecting all execution time errors while requiring a smaller fraction of the resources and power than DMR.
